Add a QUICConn type for use by QUIC implementations.
A QUICConn provides unencrypted handshake bytes and connection
secrets to the QUIC layer, and receives handshake bytes.
For #44886
Change-Id: I859dda4cc6d466a1df2fb863a69d3a2a069110d5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/493655
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
Message marshalling makes use of BytesOrPanic a lot, under the
assumption that it will never panic. This assumption was incorrect, and
specifically crafted handshakes could trigger panics. Rather than just
surgically replacing the usages of BytesOrPanic in paths that could
panic, replace all usages of it with proper error returns in case there
are other ways of triggering panics which we didn't find.
In one specific case, the tree routed by expandLabel, we replace the
usage of BytesOrPanic, but retain a panic. This function already
explicitly panicked elsewhere, and returning an error from it becomes
rather painful because it requires changing a large number of APIs.
The marshalling is unlikely to ever panic, as the inputs are all either
fixed length, or already limited to the sizes required. If it were to
panic, it'd likely only be during development. A close inspection shows
no paths for a user to cause a panic currently.
This patches ends up being rather large, since it requires routing
errors back through functions which previously had no error returns.
Where possible I've tried to use helpers that reduce the verbosity
of frequently repeated stanzas, and to make the diffs as minimal as
possible.
Thanks to Marten Seemann for reporting this issue.
Fixes#58001
Fixes CVE-2022-41724
Change-Id: Ieb55867ef0a3e1e867b33f09421932510cb58851
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1679436
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Security TryBots <security-trybots@go-security-trybots.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/468125
Run-TryBot: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
This change makes it easier for clients to debug mutual TLS connection failures. Currently, there are a few situations where invalid client auth leads to a generic "bad certificate" alert. 3 specific situations have a more appropriate TLS alert code, based on the alert descriptions in the appendix of both RFC5246 and RFC8446.
1. The server is configured to require client auth, but no client cert was provided; the appropriate alert is "certificate required". This applies only to TLS 1.3, which first defined the certificate_required alert code.
2. The client provided a cert that was signed by an authority that is not in the server's trusted set of CAs; the appropriate alert is "unknown certificate authority".
3. The client provided an expired (or not yet valid) cert; the appropriate alert is "expired certificate".
Otherwise, we still fall back to "bad certificate".
Fixes#52113
Change-Id: I7d5860fe911cad8a1615f16bfe488a37e936dc36
GitHub-Last-Rev: 34eeab5
GitHub-Pull-Request: #53251
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/410496
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
