Adds support for server-side ECH.
We make a couple of implementation decisions that are not completely
in-line with the spec. In particular, we don't enforce that the SNI
matches the ECHConfig public_name, and we implement a hybrid
shared/backend mode (rather than shared or split mode, as described in
Section 7). Both of these match the behavior of BoringSSL.
The hybrid server mode will either act as a shared mode server, where-in
the server accepts "outer" client hellos and unwraps them before
processing the "inner" hello, or accepts bare "inner" hellos initially.
This lets the server operate either transparently as a shared mode
server, or a backend server, in Section 7 terminology. This seems like
the best implementation choice for a TLS library.
Fixes#68500
Change-Id: Ife69db7c1886610742e95e76b0ca92587e6d7ed4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/623576
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Consolidates handling of FIPS 140-3 considerations for the tls package.
Considerations specific to certificates are now handled in tls instead
of x509 to limit the area-of-effect of FIPS as much as possible.
Boringcrypto specific prefixes are renamed as appropriate.
For #69536
Co-authored-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Change-Id: I1b1fef83c3599e4c9b98ad81db582ac93253030b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/629675
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
If Be and Le stand for big-endian and little-endian,
then they should be BE and LE.
Change-Id: I723e3962b8918da84791783d3c547638f1c9e8a9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/627376
Reviewed-by: Robert Griesemer <gri@google.com>
Auto-Submit: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
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This enables JA3 and JA4 TLS fingerprinting to be implemented from
the GetCertificate callback, similar to what BoringSSL provides with
its SSL_CTX_set_dos_protection_cb hook.
fixes#32936
Change-Id: Idb54ebcb43075582fcef0ac6438727f494543424
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/471396
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Forced the testConfig CurvePreferences to exclude X25519Kyber768Draft00
to avoid bloating the transcripts, but I manually tested it and the
tests all update and pass successfully, causing 7436 insertions(+), 3251
deletions(-).
Fixes#67061
Change-Id: If6f13bca561835777ab0889a490487b7c2366c3c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/586656
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
These were harmless, but added unnecessary verbosity to the code.
This can happen as a result of refactors: for example,
the method sessionState used to return errors in some cases.
Change-Id: I4e6dacc01ae6a49b528c672979f95cbb86795a85
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/528995
Reviewed-by: Leo Isla <islaleo93@gmail.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Mengué <olivier.mengue@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@google.com>
Reviewed-by: qiulaidongfeng <2645477756@qq.com>
Reviewed-by: Quim Muntal <quimmuntal@gmail.com>
Add a new GODEBUG setting, tlsmaxrsasize, which allows controlling the
maximum RSA key size we will accept during TLS handshakes.
Change-Id: I52f060be132014d219f4cd438f59990011a35c96
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/517495
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
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Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server
to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures. Limit this by
restricting the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes to <=
8192 bits.
Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only
three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all
three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It
is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target
the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the
default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable.
Thanks to Mateusz Poliwczak for reporting this issue.
Fixes#61460
Fixes CVE-2023-29409
Change-Id: Ie35038515a649199a36a12fc2c5df3af855dca6c
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1912161
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/515257
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
Run-TryBot: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
We used to inconsistently run certificate verification on the server on
resumption, but not on the client. This made TLS 1.3 resumption pretty
much useless, as it didn't save bytes, CPU, or round-trips.
This requires serializing the verified chains into the session ticket,
so it's a tradeoff making the ticket bigger to save computation (and for
consistency).
The previous behavior also had a "stickyness" issue: if a ticket
contained invalid certificates, they would be used even if the client
had in the meantime configured valid certificates for a full handshake.
We also didn't check expiration on the client side on resumption if
InsecureSkipVerify was set. Again for consistency, we do that now.
Also, we used to run VerifyPeerCertificates on resumption even if
NoClientCerts was set.
Fixes#31641
Change-Id: Icc88269ea4adb544fa81158114aae76f3c91a15f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/497895
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
All OpenSSL tests now test operation with EMS. To test a handshake
*without* EMS we need to pass -Options=-ExtendedMasterSecret which is
only available in OpenSSL 3.1, which breaks a number of other tests.
Updates #43922
Change-Id: Ib9ac79a1d03fab6bfba5fe9cd66689cff661cda7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/497376
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
There was a bug in TestResumption: the first ExpiredSessionTicket was
inserting a ticket far in the future, so the second ExpiredSessionTicket
wasn't actually supposed to fail. However, there was a bug in
checkForResumption->sendSessionTicket, too: if a session was not resumed
because it was too old, its createdAt was still persisted in the next
ticket. The two bugs used to cancel each other out.
For #60105Fixes#19199
Change-Id: Ic9b2aab943dcbf0de62b8758a6195319dc286e2f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/496821
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Another internal change, that allows exposing the new APIs easily in
following CLs.
For #60105
Change-Id: I9c61b9f6e9d29af633f952444f514bcbbe82fe4e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/496819
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This change by itself is useless, because the application has no way to
access or provide SessionStates to crypto/tls, but they will be provided
in following CLs.
For #60105
Change-Id: I8d5de79b1eda0a778420134cf6f346246a1bb296
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/496818
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Ever since session ticket key rotation was introduced in CL 9072, we've
been including a prefix in every ticket to identify what key it's
encrypted with. It's a small privacy gain, but the cost of trial
decryptions is also small, especially since the first key is probably
the most frequently used.
Also reissue tickets on every resumption so that the next connection
can't be linked to all the previous ones. Again the privacy gain is
small but the performance cost is small and it comes with a reduction in
complexity.
For #60105
Change-Id: I852f297162d2b79a3d9bf61f6171e8ce94b2537a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/496817
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Add a QUICConn type for use by QUIC implementations.
A QUICConn provides unencrypted handshake bytes and connection
secrets to the QUIC layer, and receives handshake bytes.
For #44886
Change-Id: I859dda4cc6d466a1df2fb863a69d3a2a069110d5
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/493655
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Dempsky <mdempsky@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>
Message marshalling makes use of BytesOrPanic a lot, under the
assumption that it will never panic. This assumption was incorrect, and
specifically crafted handshakes could trigger panics. Rather than just
surgically replacing the usages of BytesOrPanic in paths that could
panic, replace all usages of it with proper error returns in case there
are other ways of triggering panics which we didn't find.
In one specific case, the tree routed by expandLabel, we replace the
usage of BytesOrPanic, but retain a panic. This function already
explicitly panicked elsewhere, and returning an error from it becomes
rather painful because it requires changing a large number of APIs.
The marshalling is unlikely to ever panic, as the inputs are all either
fixed length, or already limited to the sizes required. If it were to
panic, it'd likely only be during development. A close inspection shows
no paths for a user to cause a panic currently.
This patches ends up being rather large, since it requires routing
errors back through functions which previously had no error returns.
Where possible I've tried to use helpers that reduce the verbosity
of frequently repeated stanzas, and to make the diffs as minimal as
possible.
Thanks to Marten Seemann for reporting this issue.
Fixes#58001
Fixes CVE-2022-41724
Change-Id: Ieb55867ef0a3e1e867b33f09421932510cb58851
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/1679436
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/468125
Run-TryBot: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Than McIntosh <thanm@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Michael Pratt <mpratt@google.com>
This change makes it easier for clients to debug mutual TLS connection failures. Currently, there are a few situations where invalid client auth leads to a generic "bad certificate" alert. 3 specific situations have a more appropriate TLS alert code, based on the alert descriptions in the appendix of both RFC5246 and RFC8446.
1. The server is configured to require client auth, but no client cert was provided; the appropriate alert is "certificate required". This applies only to TLS 1.3, which first defined the certificate_required alert code.
2. The client provided a cert that was signed by an authority that is not in the server's trusted set of CAs; the appropriate alert is "unknown certificate authority".
3. The client provided an expired (or not yet valid) cert; the appropriate alert is "expired certificate".
Otherwise, we still fall back to "bad certificate".
Fixes#52113
Change-Id: I7d5860fe911cad8a1615f16bfe488a37e936dc36
GitHub-Last-Rev: 34eeab5
GitHub-Pull-Request: #53251
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/410496
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <gobot@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
