mirror of
https://github.com/XTLS/REALITY.git
synced 2025-08-23 06:58:39 +00:00
In the process, replace out-of-module imports with their FIPS versions. For #69536 Change-Id: I83e900b7c38ecf760382e5dca7fd0b1eaa5a5589 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/626879 LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org> Auto-Submit: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net> Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
517 lines
15 KiB
Go
517 lines
15 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2023 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||
|
||
// Package mlkem implements the quantum-resistant key encapsulation method
|
||
// ML-KEM (formerly known as Kyber), as specified in [NIST FIPS 203].
|
||
//
|
||
// [NIST FIPS 203]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203
|
||
package mlkem
|
||
|
||
// This package targets security, correctness, simplicity, readability, and
|
||
// reviewability as its primary goals. All critical operations are performed in
|
||
// constant time.
|
||
//
|
||
// Variable and function names, as well as code layout, are selected to
|
||
// facilitate reviewing the implementation against the NIST FIPS 203 document.
|
||
//
|
||
// Reviewers unfamiliar with polynomials or linear algebra might find the
|
||
// background at https://words.filippo.io/kyber-math/ useful.
|
||
//
|
||
// This file implements the recommended parameter set ML-KEM-768. The ML-KEM-1024
|
||
// parameter set implementation is auto-generated from this file.
|
||
//
|
||
//go:generate go run generate1024.go -input mlkem768.go -output mlkem1024.go
|
||
|
||
import (
|
||
"bytes"
|
||
//"github.com/xtls/reality/fips140"
|
||
"github.com/xtls/reality/drbg"
|
||
"github.com/xtls/reality/sha3"
|
||
"github.com/xtls/reality/subtle"
|
||
"errors"
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
const (
|
||
// ML-KEM global constants.
|
||
n = 256
|
||
q = 3329
|
||
|
||
// encodingSizeX is the byte size of a ringElement or nttElement encoded
|
||
// by ByteEncode_X (FIPS 203, Algorithm 5).
|
||
encodingSize12 = n * 12 / 8
|
||
encodingSize11 = n * 11 / 8
|
||
encodingSize10 = n * 10 / 8
|
||
encodingSize5 = n * 5 / 8
|
||
encodingSize4 = n * 4 / 8
|
||
encodingSize1 = n * 1 / 8
|
||
|
||
messageSize = encodingSize1
|
||
|
||
SharedKeySize = 32
|
||
SeedSize = 32 + 32
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// ML-KEM-768 parameters.
|
||
const (
|
||
k = 3
|
||
|
||
CiphertextSize768 = k*encodingSize10 + encodingSize4
|
||
EncapsulationKeySize768 = k*encodingSize12 + 32
|
||
decapsulationKeySize768 = k*encodingSize12 + EncapsulationKeySize768 + 32 + 32
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// ML-KEM-1024 parameters.
|
||
const (
|
||
k1024 = 4
|
||
|
||
CiphertextSize1024 = k1024*encodingSize11 + encodingSize5
|
||
EncapsulationKeySize1024 = k1024*encodingSize12 + 32
|
||
decapsulationKeySize1024 = k1024*encodingSize12 + EncapsulationKeySize1024 + 32 + 32
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
// A DecapsulationKey768 is the secret key used to decapsulate a shared key from a
|
||
// ciphertext. It includes various precomputed values.
|
||
type DecapsulationKey768 struct {
|
||
d [32]byte // decapsulation key seed
|
||
z [32]byte // implicit rejection sampling seed
|
||
|
||
ρ [32]byte // sampleNTT seed for A, stored for the encapsulation key
|
||
h [32]byte // H(ek), stored for ML-KEM.Decaps_internal
|
||
|
||
encryptionKey
|
||
decryptionKey
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Bytes returns the decapsulation key as a 64-byte seed in the "d || z" form.
|
||
//
|
||
// The decapsulation key must be kept secret.
|
||
func (dk *DecapsulationKey768) Bytes() []byte {
|
||
var b [SeedSize]byte
|
||
copy(b[:], dk.d[:])
|
||
copy(b[32:], dk.z[:])
|
||
return b[:]
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TestingOnlyExpandedBytes768 returns the decapsulation key as a byte slice
|
||
// using the full expanded NIST encoding.
|
||
//
|
||
// This should only be used for ACVP testing. For all other purposes prefer
|
||
// the Bytes method that returns the (much smaller) seed.
|
||
func TestingOnlyExpandedBytes768(dk *DecapsulationKey768) []byte {
|
||
b := make([]byte, 0, decapsulationKeySize768)
|
||
|
||
// ByteEncode₁₂(s)
|
||
for i := range dk.s {
|
||
b = polyByteEncode(b, dk.s[i])
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ByteEncode₁₂(t) || ρ
|
||
for i := range dk.t {
|
||
b = polyByteEncode(b, dk.t[i])
|
||
}
|
||
b = append(b, dk.ρ[:]...)
|
||
|
||
// H(ek) || z
|
||
b = append(b, dk.h[:]...)
|
||
b = append(b, dk.z[:]...)
|
||
|
||
return b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// EncapsulationKey returns the public encapsulation key necessary to produce
|
||
// ciphertexts.
|
||
func (dk *DecapsulationKey768) EncapsulationKey() *EncapsulationKey768 {
|
||
return &EncapsulationKey768{
|
||
ρ: dk.ρ,
|
||
h: dk.h,
|
||
encryptionKey: dk.encryptionKey,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// An EncapsulationKey768 is the public key used to produce ciphertexts to be
|
||
// decapsulated by the corresponding [DecapsulationKey768].
|
||
type EncapsulationKey768 struct {
|
||
ρ [32]byte // sampleNTT seed for A
|
||
h [32]byte // H(ek)
|
||
encryptionKey
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Bytes returns the encapsulation key as a byte slice.
|
||
func (ek *EncapsulationKey768) Bytes() []byte {
|
||
// The actual logic is in a separate function to outline this allocation.
|
||
b := make([]byte, 0, EncapsulationKeySize768)
|
||
return ek.bytes(b)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (ek *EncapsulationKey768) bytes(b []byte) []byte {
|
||
for i := range ek.t {
|
||
b = polyByteEncode(b, ek.t[i])
|
||
}
|
||
b = append(b, ek.ρ[:]...)
|
||
return b
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// encryptionKey is the parsed and expanded form of a PKE encryption key.
|
||
type encryptionKey struct {
|
||
t [k]nttElement // ByteDecode₁₂(ek[:384k])
|
||
a [k * k]nttElement // A[i*k+j] = sampleNTT(ρ, j, i)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// decryptionKey is the parsed and expanded form of a PKE decryption key.
|
||
type decryptionKey struct {
|
||
s [k]nttElement // ByteDecode₁₂(dk[:decryptionKeySize])
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// GenerateKey768 generates a new decapsulation key, drawing random bytes from
|
||
// a DRBG. The decapsulation key must be kept secret.
|
||
func GenerateKey768() (*DecapsulationKey768, error) {
|
||
// The actual logic is in a separate function to outline this allocation.
|
||
dk := &DecapsulationKey768{}
|
||
return generateKey(dk)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func generateKey(dk *DecapsulationKey768) (*DecapsulationKey768, error) {
|
||
var d [32]byte
|
||
drbg.Read(d[:])
|
||
var z [32]byte
|
||
drbg.Read(z[:])
|
||
kemKeyGen(dk, &d, &z)
|
||
// if err := fips140.PCT("ML-KEM PCT", func() error { return kemPCT(dk) }); err != nil {
|
||
// // This clearly can't happen, but FIPS 140-3 requires us to check.
|
||
// panic(err)
|
||
// }
|
||
//fips140.RecordApproved()
|
||
return dk, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// GenerateKeyInternal768 is a derandomized version of GenerateKey768,
|
||
// exclusively for use in tests.
|
||
func GenerateKeyInternal768(d, z *[32]byte) *DecapsulationKey768 {
|
||
dk := &DecapsulationKey768{}
|
||
kemKeyGen(dk, d, z)
|
||
return dk
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// NewDecapsulationKey768 parses a decapsulation key from a 64-byte
|
||
// seed in the "d || z" form. The seed must be uniformly random.
|
||
func NewDecapsulationKey768(seed []byte) (*DecapsulationKey768, error) {
|
||
// The actual logic is in a separate function to outline this allocation.
|
||
dk := &DecapsulationKey768{}
|
||
return newKeyFromSeed(dk, seed)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func newKeyFromSeed(dk *DecapsulationKey768, seed []byte) (*DecapsulationKey768, error) {
|
||
if len(seed) != SeedSize {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("mlkem: invalid seed length")
|
||
}
|
||
d := (*[32]byte)(seed[:32])
|
||
z := (*[32]byte)(seed[32:])
|
||
kemKeyGen(dk, d, z)
|
||
// if err := fips140.PCT("ML-KEM PCT", func() error { return kemPCT(dk) }); err != nil {
|
||
// // This clearly can't happen, but FIPS 140-3 requires us to check.
|
||
// panic(err)
|
||
// }
|
||
//fips140.RecordApproved()
|
||
return dk, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// TestingOnlyNewDecapsulationKey768 parses a decapsulation key from its expanded NIST format.
|
||
//
|
||
// Bytes() must not be called on the returned key, as it will not produce the
|
||
// original seed.
|
||
//
|
||
// This function should only be used for ACVP testing. Prefer NewDecapsulationKey768 for all
|
||
// other purposes.
|
||
func TestingOnlyNewDecapsulationKey768(b []byte) (*DecapsulationKey768, error) {
|
||
if len(b) != decapsulationKeySize768 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("mlkem: invalid NIST decapsulation key length")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
dk := &DecapsulationKey768{}
|
||
for i := range dk.s {
|
||
var err error
|
||
dk.s[i], err = polyByteDecode[nttElement](b[:encodingSize12])
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("mlkem: invalid secret key encoding")
|
||
}
|
||
b = b[encodingSize12:]
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
ek, err := NewEncapsulationKey768(b[:EncapsulationKeySize768])
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
dk.ρ = ek.ρ
|
||
dk.h = ek.h
|
||
dk.encryptionKey = ek.encryptionKey
|
||
b = b[EncapsulationKeySize768:]
|
||
|
||
if !bytes.Equal(dk.h[:], b[:32]) {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("mlkem: inconsistent H(ek) in encoded bytes")
|
||
}
|
||
b = b[32:]
|
||
|
||
copy(dk.z[:], b)
|
||
|
||
// Generate a random d value for use in Bytes(). This is a safety mechanism
|
||
// that avoids returning a broken key vs a random key if this function is
|
||
// called in contravention of the TestingOnlyNewDecapsulationKey768 function
|
||
// comment advising against it.
|
||
drbg.Read(dk.d[:])
|
||
|
||
return dk, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// kemKeyGen generates a decapsulation key.
|
||
//
|
||
// It implements ML-KEM.KeyGen_internal according to FIPS 203, Algorithm 16, and
|
||
// K-PKE.KeyGen according to FIPS 203, Algorithm 13. The two are merged to save
|
||
// copies and allocations.
|
||
func kemKeyGen(dk *DecapsulationKey768, d, z *[32]byte) {
|
||
dk.d = *d
|
||
dk.z = *z
|
||
|
||
g := sha3.New512()
|
||
g.Write(d[:])
|
||
g.Write([]byte{k}) // Module dimension as a domain separator.
|
||
G := g.Sum(make([]byte, 0, 64))
|
||
ρ, σ := G[:32], G[32:]
|
||
dk.ρ = [32]byte(ρ)
|
||
|
||
A := &dk.a
|
||
for i := byte(0); i < k; i++ {
|
||
for j := byte(0); j < k; j++ {
|
||
A[i*k+j] = sampleNTT(ρ, j, i)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
var N byte
|
||
s := &dk.s
|
||
for i := range s {
|
||
s[i] = ntt(samplePolyCBD(σ, N))
|
||
N++
|
||
}
|
||
e := make([]nttElement, k)
|
||
for i := range e {
|
||
e[i] = ntt(samplePolyCBD(σ, N))
|
||
N++
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
t := &dk.t
|
||
for i := range t { // t = A ◦ s + e
|
||
t[i] = e[i]
|
||
for j := range s {
|
||
t[i] = polyAdd(t[i], nttMul(A[i*k+j], s[j]))
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
H := sha3.New256()
|
||
ek := dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()
|
||
H.Write(ek)
|
||
H.Sum(dk.h[:0])
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// kemPCT performs a Pairwise Consistency Test per FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.A
|
||
// Additional Comment 1: "For key pairs generated for use with approved KEMs in
|
||
// FIPS 203, the PCT shall consist of applying the encapsulation key ek to
|
||
// encapsulate a shared secret K leading to ciphertext c, and then applying
|
||
// decapsulation key dk to retrieve the same shared secret K. The PCT passes if
|
||
// the two shared secret K values are equal. The PCT shall be performed either
|
||
// when keys are generated/imported, prior to the first exportation, or prior to
|
||
// the first operational use (if not exported before the first use)."
|
||
func kemPCT(dk *DecapsulationKey768) error {
|
||
ek := dk.EncapsulationKey()
|
||
K, c := ek.Encapsulate()
|
||
K1, err := dk.Decapsulate(c)
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return err
|
||
}
|
||
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(K, K1) != 1 {
|
||
return errors.New("mlkem: PCT failed")
|
||
}
|
||
return nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Encapsulate generates a shared key and an associated ciphertext from an
|
||
// encapsulation key, drawing random bytes from a DRBG.
|
||
//
|
||
// The shared key must be kept secret.
|
||
func (ek *EncapsulationKey768) Encapsulate() (sharedKey, ciphertext []byte) {
|
||
// The actual logic is in a separate function to outline this allocation.
|
||
var cc [CiphertextSize768]byte
|
||
return ek.encapsulate(&cc)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
func (ek *EncapsulationKey768) encapsulate(cc *[CiphertextSize768]byte) (sharedKey, ciphertext []byte) {
|
||
var m [messageSize]byte
|
||
drbg.Read(m[:])
|
||
// Note that the modulus check (step 2 of the encapsulation key check from
|
||
// FIPS 203, Section 7.2) is performed by polyByteDecode in parseEK.
|
||
//fips140.RecordApproved()
|
||
return kemEncaps(cc, ek, &m)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// EncapsulateInternal is a derandomized version of Encapsulate, exclusively for
|
||
// use in tests.
|
||
func (ek *EncapsulationKey768) EncapsulateInternal(m *[32]byte) (sharedKey, ciphertext []byte) {
|
||
cc := &[CiphertextSize768]byte{}
|
||
return kemEncaps(cc, ek, m)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// kemEncaps generates a shared key and an associated ciphertext.
|
||
//
|
||
// It implements ML-KEM.Encaps_internal according to FIPS 203, Algorithm 17.
|
||
func kemEncaps(cc *[CiphertextSize768]byte, ek *EncapsulationKey768, m *[messageSize]byte) (K, c []byte) {
|
||
g := sha3.New512()
|
||
g.Write(m[:])
|
||
g.Write(ek.h[:])
|
||
G := g.Sum(nil)
|
||
K, r := G[:SharedKeySize], G[SharedKeySize:]
|
||
c = pkeEncrypt(cc, &ek.encryptionKey, m, r)
|
||
return K, c
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// NewEncapsulationKey768 parses an encapsulation key from its encoded form.
|
||
// If the encapsulation key is not valid, NewEncapsulationKey768 returns an error.
|
||
func NewEncapsulationKey768(encapsulationKey []byte) (*EncapsulationKey768, error) {
|
||
// The actual logic is in a separate function to outline this allocation.
|
||
ek := &EncapsulationKey768{}
|
||
return parseEK(ek, encapsulationKey)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// parseEK parses an encryption key from its encoded form.
|
||
//
|
||
// It implements the initial stages of K-PKE.Encrypt according to FIPS 203,
|
||
// Algorithm 14.
|
||
func parseEK(ek *EncapsulationKey768, ekPKE []byte) (*EncapsulationKey768, error) {
|
||
if len(ekPKE) != EncapsulationKeySize768 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("mlkem: invalid encapsulation key length")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
h := sha3.New256()
|
||
h.Write(ekPKE)
|
||
h.Sum(ek.h[:0])
|
||
|
||
for i := range ek.t {
|
||
var err error
|
||
ek.t[i], err = polyByteDecode[nttElement](ekPKE[:encodingSize12])
|
||
if err != nil {
|
||
return nil, err
|
||
}
|
||
ekPKE = ekPKE[encodingSize12:]
|
||
}
|
||
copy(ek.ρ[:], ekPKE)
|
||
|
||
for i := byte(0); i < k; i++ {
|
||
for j := byte(0); j < k; j++ {
|
||
ek.a[i*k+j] = sampleNTT(ek.ρ[:], j, i)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return ek, nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// pkeEncrypt encrypt a plaintext message.
|
||
//
|
||
// It implements K-PKE.Encrypt according to FIPS 203, Algorithm 14, although the
|
||
// computation of t and AT is done in parseEK.
|
||
func pkeEncrypt(cc *[CiphertextSize768]byte, ex *encryptionKey, m *[messageSize]byte, rnd []byte) []byte {
|
||
var N byte
|
||
r, e1 := make([]nttElement, k), make([]ringElement, k)
|
||
for i := range r {
|
||
r[i] = ntt(samplePolyCBD(rnd, N))
|
||
N++
|
||
}
|
||
for i := range e1 {
|
||
e1[i] = samplePolyCBD(rnd, N)
|
||
N++
|
||
}
|
||
e2 := samplePolyCBD(rnd, N)
|
||
|
||
u := make([]ringElement, k) // NTT⁻¹(AT ◦ r) + e1
|
||
for i := range u {
|
||
u[i] = e1[i]
|
||
for j := range r {
|
||
// Note that i and j are inverted, as we need the transposed of A.
|
||
u[i] = polyAdd(u[i], inverseNTT(nttMul(ex.a[j*k+i], r[j])))
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
μ := ringDecodeAndDecompress1(m)
|
||
|
||
var vNTT nttElement // t⊺ ◦ r
|
||
for i := range ex.t {
|
||
vNTT = polyAdd(vNTT, nttMul(ex.t[i], r[i]))
|
||
}
|
||
v := polyAdd(polyAdd(inverseNTT(vNTT), e2), μ)
|
||
|
||
c := cc[:0]
|
||
for _, f := range u {
|
||
c = ringCompressAndEncode10(c, f)
|
||
}
|
||
c = ringCompressAndEncode4(c, v)
|
||
|
||
return c
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Decapsulate generates a shared key from a ciphertext and a decapsulation key.
|
||
// If the ciphertext is not valid, Decapsulate returns an error.
|
||
//
|
||
// The shared key must be kept secret.
|
||
func (dk *DecapsulationKey768) Decapsulate(ciphertext []byte) (sharedKey []byte, err error) {
|
||
if len(ciphertext) != CiphertextSize768 {
|
||
return nil, errors.New("mlkem: invalid ciphertext length")
|
||
}
|
||
c := (*[CiphertextSize768]byte)(ciphertext)
|
||
// Note that the hash check (step 3 of the decapsulation input check from
|
||
// FIPS 203, Section 7.3) is foregone as a DecapsulationKey is always
|
||
// validly generated by ML-KEM.KeyGen_internal.
|
||
return kemDecaps(dk, c), nil
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// kemDecaps produces a shared key from a ciphertext.
|
||
//
|
||
// It implements ML-KEM.Decaps_internal according to FIPS 203, Algorithm 18.
|
||
func kemDecaps(dk *DecapsulationKey768, c *[CiphertextSize768]byte) (K []byte) {
|
||
//fips140.RecordApproved()
|
||
m := pkeDecrypt(&dk.decryptionKey, c)
|
||
g := sha3.New512()
|
||
g.Write(m[:])
|
||
g.Write(dk.h[:])
|
||
G := g.Sum(make([]byte, 0, 64))
|
||
Kprime, r := G[:SharedKeySize], G[SharedKeySize:]
|
||
J := sha3.NewShake256()
|
||
J.Write(dk.z[:])
|
||
J.Write(c[:])
|
||
Kout := make([]byte, SharedKeySize)
|
||
J.Read(Kout)
|
||
var cc [CiphertextSize768]byte
|
||
c1 := pkeEncrypt(&cc, &dk.encryptionKey, (*[32]byte)(m), r)
|
||
|
||
subtle.ConstantTimeCopy(subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(c[:], c1), Kout, Kprime)
|
||
return Kout
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// pkeDecrypt decrypts a ciphertext.
|
||
//
|
||
// It implements K-PKE.Decrypt according to FIPS 203, Algorithm 15,
|
||
// although s is retained from kemKeyGen.
|
||
func pkeDecrypt(dx *decryptionKey, c *[CiphertextSize768]byte) []byte {
|
||
u := make([]ringElement, k)
|
||
for i := range u {
|
||
b := (*[encodingSize10]byte)(c[encodingSize10*i : encodingSize10*(i+1)])
|
||
u[i] = ringDecodeAndDecompress10(b)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
b := (*[encodingSize4]byte)(c[encodingSize10*k:])
|
||
v := ringDecodeAndDecompress4(b)
|
||
|
||
var mask nttElement // s⊺ ◦ NTT(u)
|
||
for i := range dx.s {
|
||
mask = polyAdd(mask, nttMul(dx.s[i], ntt(u[i])))
|
||
}
|
||
w := polySub(v, inverseNTT(mask))
|
||
|
||
return ringCompressAndEncode1(nil, w)
|
||
} |