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THE NEXT FUTURE
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yuhan6665 a74700bdda crypto/tls: match compression method alert across versions
When a pre-TLS 1.3 server processes a client hello message that
indicates compression methods that don't include the null compression
method, send an illegal parameter alert.

Previously we did this for TLS 1.3 server handshakes only, and the
legacy TLS versions used alertHandshakeFailure for this circumstance. By
switching this to alertIllegalParameter we use a consistent alert across
all TLS versions, and can also enable the NoNullCompression-TLS12 BoGo
test we were skipping.

Updates #72006

Change-Id: I27a2cd231e4b8762b0d9e2dbd3d8ddd5b87fd5ce
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/673736
TryBot-Bypass: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: David Chase <drchase@google.com>
2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
fips140tls crypto/tls: FIPS 140-3 mode 2025-05-04 23:10:11 -04:00
hpke Simplify with public modules 2025-05-05 11:40:53 -04:00
tls12 Simplify with public modules 2025-05-05 11:40:53 -04:00
tls13 Simplify with public modules 2025-05-05 11:40:53 -04:00
alert.go crypto/tls: add ech client support 2024-09-09 11:32:16 -04:00
auth.go crypto/tls: clean up supported/default/allowed parameters 2025-05-10 17:13:05 -04:00
cache.go crypto/tls: replace custom intern cache with weak cache 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
cipher_suites.go Use public module for AES GCM 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
common_string.go crypto/tls: implement X25519MLKEM768 2025-05-10 15:06:04 -04:00
common.go crypto/tls: have servers prefer TLS 1.3 when supported 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
conn.go crypto/tls: replace custom intern cache with weak cache 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
defaults_boring.go crypto/tls: relax native FIPS 140-3 mode 2025-05-10 23:09:16 -04:00
defaults_fips140.go crypto/tls: relax native FIPS 140-3 mode 2025-05-10 23:09:16 -04:00
defaults.go crypto/tls: clean up supported/default/allowed parameters 2025-05-10 17:13:05 -04:00
ech.go crypto/tls: add GetEncryptedClientHelloKeys 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
generate_cert.go Sync upstream Go 1.20 2023-11-12 12:08:30 -05:00
go.mod crypto/tls: use crypto/hkdf 2025-05-10 23:30:06 -04:00
go.sum Update dependencies 2025-05-25 16:09:29 -04:00
handshake_client_tls13.go crypto/tls: replace custom intern cache with weak cache 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
handshake_client.go crypto/tls: replace custom intern cache with weak cache 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
handshake_messages.go crypto/tls: fix misspelling in comment 2025-05-10 15:14:04 -04:00
handshake_server_tls13.go crypto/tls: add GetEncryptedClientHelloKeys 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
handshake_server.go crypto/tls: match compression method alert across versions 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
key_agreement.go crypto/tls: verify server chooses advertised curve 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
key_schedule.go crypto/tls: delete dead code curveIDForCurve 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
LICENSE Prepare for REALITY protocol 2023-01-29 14:32:27 +00:00
LICENSE-Go Package tls in Go 1.19.5 2023-01-29 14:31:01 +00:00
prf.go crypto/internal/fips/tls12: implement TLS 1.2 KDF 2025-05-04 22:15:27 -04:00
quic.go crypto/tls: fix typo in quicError 2024-09-09 11:32:16 -04:00
README.en.md Update dependencies and readme 2023-11-12 12:13:32 -05:00
README.md Add Star Chart 2024-04-29 18:49:17 -04:00
ticket.go crypto/tls: replace custom intern cache with weak cache 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00
tls.go Use public module for AES GCM 2025-05-26 20:01:05 -04:00

REALITY

THE NEXT FUTURE

Server side implementation of REALITY protocol, a fork of package tls in latest Go. For client side, please follow https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-core/blob/main/transport/internet/reality/reality.go.

TODO List: TODO

VLESS-XTLS-uTLS-REALITY example for Xray-core

中文 | English

{
    "inbounds": [ // Server Inbound Configuration
        {
            "listen": "0.0.0.0",
            "port": 443,
            "protocol": "vless",
            "settings": {
                "clients": [
                    {
                        "id": "", // Required, execute ./xray uuid to generate, or a string of 1-30 characters
                        "flow": "xtls-rprx-vision" // Optional, if any, client must enable XTLS
                    }
                ],
                "decryption": "none"
            },
            "streamSettings": {
                "network": "tcp",
                "security": "reality",
                "realitySettings": {
                    "show": false, // Optional, if true, output debugging information
                    "dest": "example.com:443", // Required, the format is the same as the dest of VLESS fallbacks
                    "xver": 0, // Optional, the format is the same as xver of VLESS fallbacks
                    "serverNames": [ // Required, the acceptable serverName list, does not support * wildcards for now
                        "example.com",
                        "www.example.com"
                    ],
                    "privateKey": "", // Required, execute ./xray x25519 to generate
                    "minClientVer": "", // Optional, minimum client Xray version, format is x.y.z
                    "maxClientVer": "", // Optional, the highest version of client Xray, the format is x.y.z
                    "maxTimeDiff": 0, // Optional, the maximum time difference allowed, in milliseconds
                    "shortIds": [ // Required, the acceptable shortId list, which can be used to distinguish different clients
                        "", // If there is this item, the client shortId can be empty
                        "0123456789abcdef" // 0 to f, the length is a multiple of 2, the maximum length is 16
                    ]
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

REALITY is intented to replace the use of TLS, it can eliminate the detectable TLS fingerprint on the server side, while still maintain the forward secrecy, etc. Guard against the certificate chain attack, thus its security exceeds conventional TLS REALITY can point to other people's websites, no need to buy domain names, configure TLS server, more convenient to deploy a proxy service. It achieves full real TLS that is undistingwishable with the specified SNI to the middleman

For general proxy purposes, the minimum standard of the target website: Websites out of China's GFW, support TLSv1.3 and H2, the domain name is not used for redirection (the main domain name may be used to redirect to www) Bonus points: target website IP reside closer to proxy IP (looks more reasonable, and lower latency), handshake messages after Server Hello are encrypted together (such as dl.google.com), OCSP Stapling Configuration bonus items: Block the proxy traffic back to China, TCP/80, UDP/443 are also forwarded to target (REALITY behaves like port forwarding to the observer, the target IP may be better if it is an uncommon choice among REALITY users)

REALITY can also be used with proxy protocols other than XTLS, but this is not recommended due to their obvious and already targeted TLS in TLS characteristics The next main goal of REALITY is "pre-built mode", that is, to collect and build the characteristics of the target website in advance, and the next main goal of XTLS is 0-RTT

{
    "outbounds": [ // Client outbound configuration
        {
            "protocol": "vless",
            "settings": {
                "vnext": [
                    {
                        "address": "", // The domain name or IP of the server
                        "port": 443,
                        "users": [
                            {
                                "id": "", // consistent with the server
                                "flow": "xtls-rprx-vision", // consistent with the server
                                "encryption": "none"
                            }
                        ]
                    }
                ]
            },
            "streamSettings": {
                "network": "tcp",
                "security": "reality",
                "realitySettings": {
                    "show": false, // Optional, if true, output debugging information
                    "fingerprint": "chrome", // Required, use uTLS library to emulate client TLS fingerprint
                    "serverName": "", // One of the server serverNames
                    "publicKey": "", // The public key corresponding to the private key of the server
                    "shortId": "", // One of the server shortIds
                    "spiderX": "" // The initial path and parameters of the crawler, recommended to be different for each client
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

The REALITY client should receive the "Temporary Trusted Certificate" issued by "Temporary Authentication Key", but the real certificate of the target website will be received in the following three cases:

  1. The REALITY server rejects the Client Hello of the client, and the traffic is redirected to the target website
  2. The Client Hello of the client is redirected to the target website by the middleman
  3. Man-in-the-middle attack, it may be the help of the target website, or it may be a certificate chain attack

The REALITY client can perfectly distinguish temporary trusted certificates, real certificates, and invalid certificates, and decide the next action:

  1. When the temporary trusted certificate is received, the proxy connection is available and everything is business as usual
  2. When the real certificate is received, enter the crawler mode (spiderX)
  3. When an invalid certificate is received, TLS alert will be sent and the connection will be disconnected